

**POLSCI 760S**  
**Core in Security, Peace, and Conflict (SPC)**  
**Spring 2025**

**Prof. Eric Mvukiyehe (with SPC faculty in rotation)**  
**Mondays, 3:20 to 5:50PM**  
**Class location: Gross Hall 105.**

**Office hours: Thursday from 1:30 to 2:30 PM or by appointment.**

**Sign-up: [<https://calendly.com/eric-mvukiyehe/15min>]**

### **Overview**

This course introduces students to the literature and research agendas related to studies in international relations (security, peace and conflict). We will cover a wide array of approaches that relate to both interstate and intrastate conflict and cooperation. While we will not have time to comprehensively cover all the important relevant work, we will sample a spectrum of the work from the foundational studies to the state-of-the-art approaches.

This course will feature most SPC faculty in rotation. **Professor Mvukiyehe** will cover topics related to intra-state cooperation and conflict and he will be responsible for all the grading.

For the interstate part of the course, we will have a rotation of SPC faculty who will cover different "core" IR topics. The faculty rotation will include Professors **Rachel Myrick, Kyle Beardsley, Peter Feaver, David Siegal, Emerson Niou, and Shelly Liu**. We will be alternating between interstate topics and substate topics on a weekly or bi-weekly basis, though we might occasionally have a different sequencing in some weeks to accommodate scheduling conflicts of some of the faculty participating in the rotation.

### **Goals**

Through the readings and discussion, students will get a sense for where the literature has been and where it is going. As students move forward with their studies, this course will help students develop a fuller sense of the context in which other work they read is situated. Students will also be able to better understand the contribution of new work, including their own.

Students will also develop important skills necessary for the completion of their own original scholarship. Specifically, they will hone their ability to quickly analyze the research in the field and be able to identify the contributions and potential flaws. Students will also be exposed to a variety of research designs and cultivate a sense for some best practices in the field.

The final paper in the course is intended to help students move from a role of being a consumer and critic of research to a producer of the research. The students will construct falsifiable hypotheses that will help advance our understanding of international security, peace and conflict and then propose a rigorous research design to test those hypotheses.

## Requirements

There are four graded components of this course. Students are expected to strictly adhere to the Duke Community Standard in all of their work and participation, and violations will be enforced. All sources must be correctly cited, and all work must be each student's own. All late assignments and papers will lose one letter grade of credit for each day late. Professor Mvukiyehe will share gradin; all grading inquiries should be addressed to both of them.

### *Attendance and class Participation (20%)*

In-person attendance is required to make the most of in-class discussion, and the class sessions will not be recorded. The course will rely heavily on class discussion, so each student is expected to come to class with all the required reading completed. Students are also expected to actively contribute to the discussion, not just quantitatively, but also qualitatively. Your participation grade will be proportional to the class sessions you attend and the level of your participation in class discussion. Students who cannot attend class because of illness, COVID-19-related isolation, or participation in Duke-related activities, should inform the instructor as soon as feasible to discuss alternative arrangements to make up for missed work.

### *Short Summary Papers (2 x 10% = 20% total)*

Every three to four weeks or so, students will briefly summarize the assigned readings for one week of their choice. These will be due on **February 10 and March 24**, respectively by the start of the class. The goal is to encourage you to read course materials carefully and critically and be able to succinctly summarize the main takeaways in relation to the relevant weekly topic. Summary papers should be around 500 words and analytical (i.e., glean from the readings the key theoretical arguments, mechanisms, and empirics, in terms of their similarities, differences, complementarities, etc.), rather than mere reading summaries. There should be two components of the summaries.

1. The summaries should relate the week's readings to each other.
  - a. How do they agree?
  - b. How do they differ?
  - c. How do they build on each other?
  - d. Do some of the readings touch on completely different topics?
2. The summaries should provide a quick snapshot of the articles.
  - a. For each article, state the research question in one sentence
  - b. For each article, state the puzzle being addressed
  - c. For each article, state the central argument in one sentence
  - d. For each article, summarize what comparisons were made (if any) to test the argument in one sentence.

### *Written Referee Reports of recently published or working papers in progress (2 x 15% = 30% total)*

Over the course of the Semester, students will be required to select and review any two published papers in the last two years and/or working papers in progress related to the weekly theme/topics. One of the reviewed papers should be on interstate-related topics and the other on intrastate-related topics. Students interested in writing about a related paper that has been published in the last 2 years, the report should provide some reflection on in which the study could be leveraged/expanded up on to answer questions left unaddressed or begin exploring some of the areas identified for further

research. The review on working paper in progress should be styled as if it is an anonymous referee report for a peer-review journal (the instructors will post examples). The review should start with a brief summary of the arguments, empirical evidence (2 paragraphs) as well as the relevance/contributions of the manuscript (1 paragraph) and then turn to constructive criticism of the work, including pointing out deficiencies and possible extensions. The review should be around 500 words in length. The best reviews will be anonymized and sent to the authors of the manuscripts. The goals of this assignment include 1) practicing an important part of an academic's intellectual life; 2) honing the ability to critically evaluate state-of-the-art research; 3) becoming familiar with the frontier of the subfield; and 4) providing colleagues valuable feedback as they improve their work. Students will be evaluated on the accuracy of their summary, the clarity in the articulation of the points, and the extent to which the comments are constructive in pointing to possible adjustments that might be made (including pointing to innovations made in the assigned readings for the week).

The first referee report will be due on **February 24** (week 7 of class) and the second on **April 7** (week 12 of class), before class. The choice will be up to the student as to whether they want to review a paper related to interstate topics first and intrastate topics second (or vice versa). The main thing to keep in mind is that you will need to do both, and you will need to clear your paper with me in advance. I will share further guidance on these assignments several weeks before the due dates.

### *Final Research Paper (30%)*

At the end of the semester, students will turn in a research paper around 20 pages in length (double spaced, including the bibliography). The paper must: (i) address a theoretical question, clearly identifying gaps your research could potentially fill and its contribution to the literature and providing a coherent argument and mechanisms; and (ii) empirically evaluate the said arguments and mechanisms in depth, using an illustrative historical case or quantitative evidence—or alternatively provide the protocol for a rigorous research design you might be able to implement in the near future. For students writing their final paper as a research proposal, we recommend that the protocol for the research design use as a starting point the research design from a published work—doing so will encourage deeper understanding of existing approaches and develop the practice of making marginal contributions without needing to reinvent the wheel. The final paper will be due on the last day of the reading period, which is **April 28 by 6PM EST** (Late papers will lose one letter grade for each day late.) The citations and bibliography should consistently be in the style of one of the major political science journals.

You will be strongly encouraged to start thinking about your final paper topic as early as possible, but around **March 3** (week 8) you will be required to submit an abstract/brief paragraph outlining your research question/topic and ideas, including an overview of the research contribution and the selection of an empirical strategy/illustrative case so that we can provide you with some (hopefully helpful) feedback before you develop your research further.

### **Schedule/ weekly topics**

#### **Wednesday, January 8      Cooperation and Conflict under Anarchy**

1. Jervis, Robert (1999). "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *International Security*, 24(1): 42-63.
2. Fearon, J. (2018). Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy. *International Organization*, 72(3), 523-559.

3. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), pp.52-72.
4. Lake, D. A. (2007). Escape from the state of nature: Authority and hierarchy in world politics. *International Security*, 32(1), 47-79.
5. Sjoberg, Laura (2012). Gender, Structure and War: What Waltz Couldn't See. *International Theory* 4(1): 1-38.

Recommended and further readings:

- Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane (1985). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics* 38(1):226-254.
- Grieco, Joseph (2017). "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalist."
- Deutsch, K. W., & Singer, J. D. (1964). Multipolar power systems and international stability. *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*, 390-406.
- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917.
- Galtung, J. (1971). A structural theory of imperialism. *Journal of peace research*, 81-117.
- Powell, R. (1996). Stability and the Distribution of Power. *World Politics*, 48(2), 239-267.
- Vasquez, J. A. (1997). The realist paradigm and degenerative versus progressive research programs: An appraisal of neotraditional research on Waltz's balancing proposition. *American Political Science Review*, 899-912.
- Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. *World Politics*, 30(02), 167-214.
- Van Evera, S. (1998). Offense, defense, and the causes of war. *International Security*, 22(4), 5-43.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46(02), 391-425.
- Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, 25(1), 5-41.
- Biddle, S. (2001). Rebuilding the foundations of offense-defense theory. *The Journal of Politics*, 63(03), 741-774.
- Fortna, Page. "Has Violence Declined in World Politics?" *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 02 (2013): 566-570.
- Morgenthau, H. J., Thompson, K. W., & Clinton, W. D. (1985). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace.*

**Working paper:** [None assigned for this week.]

**Monday, January 13      Peace through Strength: Power, Deterrence and Reputation**

1. Snyder. 1961. *Deterrence and Defense*, Chapter 1, pgs. 3-40 ONLY. (Free to read online through Duke Libraries)
2. Press. 2004/2005. "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the 'Appeasement' Crises of the 1930s." *International Security* 29(3): 136-169.
3. Crescenzi. 2007. "Reputation and Interstate Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 382-396.

4. Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo. 2015. "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics." *International Organization* 69(2): 473-495.
5. Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo. 2021. "How Do Observers Assess Resolve?" *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(1): 308-330.

- **Applications to Discuss:**

- Ioffe. 2016. "How Russia Saw the 'Red Line' Crisis." *The Atlantic*, March 11
- Kertzer. 2021. "American Credibility After Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs*, September 2.
- Myers and Qin. 2022. "Both Sides of Taiwan Strait Are Closely Watching Ukraine's Crisis." *The New York Times*, February 7.

**Working Paper:** Renshon & Powers. 2024. "Identity and the Social Construction of Reputation in World Politics." (available [here](#)).

Recommended and further readings:

- Copeland, Dale C. "Do reputations matter?" *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 33-71.
- Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. "Reputation and status as motives for war." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 371-393.
- Danilovic, Vesna. *When Stakes are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers*. University of Michigan Press.
- Goldfien, Michael A., Michael F. Joseph, and Roseanne W. McManus. 2023. "The Domestic Sources of International Reputation." *American Political Science Review*.
- Harvey, Frank P., and John Mitton. *Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation and International Politics*. University of Toronto Press, 2016.
- Hopf, Ted. *Peripheral visions: Deterrence theory and American foreign policy in the third world, 1965-1990*. University of Michigan Press, 1994.
- Huth, Paul K. "Extended deterrence and the outbreak of war." *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): 423-443.
- Huth, Paul K. "Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment." *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 72-99.
- Jervis, Robert, and Jack Snyder, eds. *Dominoes and bandwagons: Strategic beliefs and great power competition in the Eurasian rimland*. Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Jervis, Robert, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler. 2021. "Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship." *World Politics* 73(1): 167-203.
- Kertzer, Joshua D. *Resolve in International Politics*. Princeton University Press, 2016.
- Lupton, Danielle L. *Reputation for Resolve*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- McManus, Roseanne W. *Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Mercer, Jonathan. *Reputation and international politics*. In *Reputation and International Politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2018.
- Nalebuff, Barry. 1991. "Rational deterrence in an imperfect world." *World Politics* 43, no. 3: 313-335.
- Press, Daryl Grayson. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005.

- Renshon, Jonathan. *Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017.
- Renshon, Jonathan, Allan Dafoe, and Paul Huth. "Leader influence and reputation formation in world politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 2 (2018): 325-339.
- Sartori, Anne E. *Deterrence by Diplomacy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Snyder, Glenn Herald. *Deterrence and defense*. Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Tang, Shiping. "Reputation, cult of reputation, and international conflict." *Security Studies* 14, no. 1 (2005): 34-62.
- Yarhi-Milo, Keren. *Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018.

**[MONDAY, January 20: NO CLASS—MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. HOLIDAY!]**

### January 27 Social Order through State Capacity and Institutions

1. Karaman, Kivanc and Sevket Pamuk. 2013. "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime." *American Political Science Review*, 107 (3): 603-626. [Link](#).
2. Herbst, Jeffrey. 1990. "War and the State in Africa." *International Security*, 14 (4): 117-139. [Link](#).
3. Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2016. "Paths to Inclusive Political Institutions." [Link](#).
4. Sa´nchez de la Sierra, Rau´l. 2020. "On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 128 (1): 32-74. [Link](#).
5. Henn, Soeren. 2022. "Complements or Substitutes: State Presence and the Power of Traditional Leaders." *American Political Science Review*, 1-20. [Link](#).
6. Bal´an, Pablo, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan Weigel. 2022. "Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *American Economic Review*, 112(3): 762–797. [Link](#).

**Working paper:** Mastroiocco, Nicola and Edoardo Teso (2023). "State capacity as an organizational problem. evidence from the growth of the US state over 100 years." NBER Working Paper #31591. Accessible at: [Link](#).

### Recommended readings (optional)

- a) Spencer, Charles. 2010. "Territorial Expansion and Primary State Formation." *Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences*, 107 (16) 7119-7126. [Link](#).
- b) Lee, Melissa and Nan Zhang. 2017. "Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity." *Journal of Politics*, 79(1): 118-132. [Link](#).
- c) Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review*, 87 (3): 567-576. [Link](#).

- d) Revkin, Mara Redlich, and Ariel I. Ahram. "Perspectives on the rebel social contract: Exit, voice, and loyalty in the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." *World Development* 132 (2020): 104981. [Link](#).
- e) Van der Windt, Peter; Macartan Humphreys; Lily Medina; Jeffrey Timmons, and Maarten Voors (2019.) "Citizen Attitudes Toward Traditional and State Authorities: Substitutes or Complements?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(12): 1810 -1840. [Link](#).
- f) Blattman. Christophe, Alexandra Hartman and Robert Blair. 2014. "How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education." *American Political Science Review*, 108 (1): 100-120. [Link](#).

### Further readings

- Hirshleifer, Jack. 1995. "Anarchy and its breakdown." *Journal of Political Economy*, 103 (1): 26-52.
- Powell, Robert. 1993. "Guns, butter, and anarchy". *American Political Science Review*, 87 (1): 115-132.
- Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights." *American Economic Review*, 82(4): 720-739.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Chapter 1.]
- Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Dietrich Rueschemeyer Peter B. Evans and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge University Press pp. 169–87.
- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and the European State: 990-1990*. B. Blackwell.
- Chapters 1 – 3.
- Karim, Sabrina. 2020. "Relational State Building in Areas of Limited Statehood: Experimental Evidence on the Attitudes of the Police." *American Political Science Review*, 114(2): 536-551.
- Grossman, Herschel. 2002. "Make us a king: anarchy, predation, and the state." *European Journal of Political Economy*, 18 (1): 31-46.
- Carneiro, Robert. 1970. "A Theory of the Origin of the State". *Science*, 169 (3947): 733-738.
- Dube, Arandrajit, Oeindrila Dube, and Omar Garcia-Ponce. 2013. "Cross Border Spillover: US Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico." *American Political Science Review*,
- Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. "Organizing violence." 2002. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46 (5): 599-628.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2022. "Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition". *American Political Science Review*, 1-14.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed and Robinson. 2014. "Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone." *Journal of Political Economy*, 122 (2): 319-368.
- Acemoglu, Daron and Vindigni, Andrea and Ticchi, Davide. 2010. "Persistence of civil wars." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 8 (2-3): 664-676.
- Weber, Max. "Bureaucracy" in his *Economy and Society*.vol.2, pp.956-1005.
- Dincecco, Mark. 2015. "The Rise of Effective States Europe." *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 75, 901-18.
- Johnson, Noel and Mark Koyama. 2014. "Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France." *Explorations in Economic History*, 51: 1-20.

- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. [Introduction; Chapter 1; skim through chapter 5 and the Conclusion.]
- Intrinsic and social incentives in state and non-state armed groups. *American Political Science Review*, 117(1): 22-41.
- Abramson, Scott F. 2017. "The Economic Origins of the Territorial State." *International Organization*, 71 (1): 97-130.
- Hanson, Jonathan, and Rachel Sigman. 2021. "Leviathan's Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research," *Journal of Politics*, forthcoming.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York, NY. [Skim through chapters 1, 2 and 12.]
- Dincecco, Mark and Gabriel Katz. 2016. "State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance." *The Economic Journal*, 126(590): 189-218.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2022. "Weak, Despotism, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition". *American Political Science Review*, 1-14.
- Revkin, Mara (2020). "What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria." *The Journal of Politics*, 82(2): 757-764.
- Muller-Crepon, Carl, Philipp Hunziker, and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2021. "Roads to Rule, Roads to Rebel: Relational State Capacity and Conflict in Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 65(2-3): 563-590.
- Van der Windt, Peter; Macartan Humphreys; Lily Medina; Jeffrey Timmons, and Maarten Voors (2019.) "Citizen Attitudes Toward Traditional and State Authorities: Substitutes or Complements?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(12): 1810 -1840.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics," *American Economic Review*, 99(4): 1218-44.
- Robert I. Rotberg, ed. 2004. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Chapters 1; skim through chapters 2 and 3.]
- Sánchez de la Sierra, Raúl. 2020. "On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo," *Journal of Political Economy*, 128 (1): 32-74.
- Garfias, Francisco. 2018. "Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico," *American Political Science Review*, 112(2): 339-357.
- Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2010. "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 190-208.
- Lambach, Daniel, Eva Johais and Markus Bayer. 2015. "Conceptualizing state collapse: an institutionalist approach." *Third World Quarterly*, 36(7): 1299-1315.
- Krasner, Stephen. 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States", *International Security*, 29 (2): 85-120.

### February 3      **Bargaining and Information**

1. Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
2. Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization*, Volume 60(1): 169 - 203.

**Working paper:** [None assigned for this week.]

Recommended and further readings:

- Powell, R. (2004). Bargaining and learning while fighting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2), 344-361.
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power." *Games and Economic Behavior* 15(2): 255-289.
- Fearon, J. D. (1997). Signaling foreign policy interests tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1), 68-90.
- Beardsley, K. (2008). Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4), 723-740.
- Kydd, A. (2003). Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(4), 597-611.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 621-632. Corrected proof is here: <http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/errata/aprsr2003b.pdf>
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Stability and the Distribution of Power." *World Politics* 48(2): 239-267.
- Kydd, A. (2003). Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(4), 597-611.
- Leventoğlu, Bahar & Ahmer S. Tarar. 2008. "Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?" *International Studies Quarterly* 52(3): 533-553. Unpublished Technical Supplement here: <http://people.duke.edu/~bl38/articles/warinfoisq2008unpubsupp.Pdf>
- Leventoğlu, Bahar 2022. "Bargaining and War." In Kyle Hyndman and Emin Karagozoglu eds., *Current Research and Future Directions in Bargaining*. Palgrave-MacMillan.
- Kinne, B. J. (2013). Network dynamics and the evolution of international cooperation. *American Political Science Review*, 107(4), 766-785. 5.
- Quek, K. (2021). Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms. *American Political Science Review*, 115(2), 537-549. 6.
- Baliga, S., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Wolitzky, A. (2020). Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution. *American Political Science Review*, 114(4), 1155-1178.
- Pierskalla, Jan H. and Hollenbach, Florian M. (2013). Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 107, pp 207-224.
- Little, A. T., & Zeitzoff, T. (2017). A Bargaining Theory of Conflict with Evolutionary Preferences. *International Organization*, 1-35.
- Thompson, A. (2006). Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the logic of information transmission. *International Organization*, 60(1).
- Jung, D. F., & Lake, D. A. (2011). Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks: An Agent-Based Organizational Ecology. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4), 972-990.
- Schultz, K. A. (1999). Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. *International Organization*, 53(2), 233-266.

## February 10 Breakdown of order II: Civil war and ethnic conflict

1. Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review*, 97(1): 75-90.
2. Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics*, 62 (1): 87–119.
3. Weinstein, Jeremy. 2005. "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(4): 598–624.
4. Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez, and Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2014. "Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond." *Journal of Peace Research*, 51 (2): 213–26. Also, SKIM THROUGH Thomas, Jakana L. and Kanisha D. Bond. 2015. "Women's Participation in Violent Political Organizations." *American Political Science Review* 109(3):488–506.
5. Walter, Barbara F. 2017. "The New New Civil Wars." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20: 469–86.

**Working paper (option #1):** Blair, Christopher and Austin Wright (2022). "Refugee Return and Conflict: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Accessible at: [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3885937](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3885937) OR

**Working paper (option #2):** Haim, Dotan (2024). "Networks and Insurgency: How Civilian Social Relationships Shape Conflict". Accessible at: [https://www.dropbox.com/s/y9ekjyqplmq3t80/2023\\_WP\\_Haim\\_NetworksInsurgency.pdf?dl=0](https://www.dropbox.com/s/y9ekjyqplmq3t80/2023_WP_Haim_NetworksInsurgency.pdf?dl=0)

### Recommended and further readings:

- Denny, Elaine, and Barbara Walter. 2014. "Ethnicity and civil war." *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2): 199-212.
- Walter, Barbara. 2009. "Bargaining Failures and Civil War." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:243-61.
- Gates, Scott. 2017. "Membership matters: Coerced recruits and rebel allegiance." *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(5):674–686.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [Chapters 6 & 7]. Or Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2000. "The logic of violence in civil war". Unpublished manuscript, New York University. It can be accessed [here](#).
- Chaudhry, Chaudhry, Sabrina Karim, Matt K Scroggs (2020). "How leaders' experiences and rebellion shape military recruitment during civil war."
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4): 563–95.
- Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002). "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(1): 13-28.
- Gates, Scott (2002). "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2002): 111–130.

- Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. 2010. "Civil War." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48 (1): 3-57.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. "Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part I)." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(3): 259- 282.
- Kirschner, Shanna. 2010. "Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(5): 745-770.
- Posen, Barry (1993). "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict." *Survival*, 35(1): 27- 47.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Nils Benedikt Weidmann (2011). "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison." *American Political Science Review*, 105(3): 478-95.
- Kalyvas, Stathis (2003). "The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics*, 1: 475-494.
- Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012. "Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War." *World Politics*, 64(1): 79-115.
- Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. 2005. Ethnic polarization, potential conflict, and civil wars. *American economic review*, 95(3): 796-816.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. (2001). "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics*, Vol. 54(1): 99-118.
- Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. [Skim through chapters 1, 5 and 8.]
- Roessler, Phillip and David Ohls (2018). "Self-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States." *International Organization*, 72(2): 423-454. Also skim through: Fearon, James and David Laitin (1996). "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review*, 90(4): 715-735.
- Ibáñez, Ana María, Ana Arjona, and Patricia Justino (2023). "The Long-Term Economic Legacies of Rebel Rule in Civil War: Micro Evidence From Colombia." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. *Forthcoming*.

## February 17      Credibility and Mistrust

1. Werner, S. (1999). The precarious nature of peace: Resolving the issues, enforcing the settlement, and renegotiating the terms. *American Journal of Political Science*, 912-934.
2. Powell, R. (2006). War as a commitment problem. *International Organization*, 60(01), 169-203.
3. Debs, A., & Monteiro, N. P. (2014). Known unknowns: Power shifts, uncertainty, and war. *International Organization*, 68(1), 1-31.
4. Yoder, Brandon, and Kyle Haynes. "Endogenous preferences, credible signaling, and the security dilemma: Bridging the rationalist-constructivist divide." *American Journal of Political Science* (2024).
5. Benson, Brett V., and Bradley C. Smith. "Commitment problems in alliance formation." *American Journal of Political Science* 67, no. 4 (2023): 1012-1025.

**Working Paper:** [None assigned for this week.]

### Recommended and further readings:

- Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2013. In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries. *International Security* 38(1): 7-51.
- Powell, R. (2006). War as a commitment problem. *International Organization*, 60(01), 169-20
- Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2), 461-476.
- Coe, A., & Vaynman, J. (2020). Why Arms Control Is So Rare. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), 342-355.
- Grieco, J. M., Gelpi, C., Reifler, J., & Feather, P. D. (2011). Let's get a second opinion: International institutions and American public support for war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(2), 563-583.
- Kydd, A. (2000). Trust, reassurance, and cooperation. *International Organization*, 54(2), 325-
- Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996). Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? *International Organization*, 50, 379-406.
- Page Fortna, P. (2003). Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *International Organization* 57(2): 337-372.
- Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2010). Information, agreement design, and the durability of civil war settlements. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2), 511-524.
- Buisseret, P., & Bernhardt, D. (2018). Reelection and Renegotiation: International Agreements in the Shadow of the Polls. *American Political Science Review*, 112(4), 1016-1035.
- McLaughlin Mitchell, S., & Hensel, P. R. (2007). International institutions and compliance with agreements. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), 721-737.
- Renshon, J., Lee, J. J., & Tingley, D. (2017). Emotions and the micro-foundations of commitment problems. *International Organization*, 71(S1), S189-S218.
- Carnegie, Allison. "States Held Hostage: Political Hold-up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 01 (2014): 54-70.
- Tingley, Dustin H. "The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of Commitment Problems in Bargaining." *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (2011): 521-544.
- Lo, N., Hashimoto, B., & Reiter, D. (2008). Ensuring peace: Foreign-imposed regime change and postwar peace duration, 1914–2001. *International Organization*, 62(4), 717-736.
- Webster, K., Torres, P., Chen, C., & Beardsley, K. (2020). Ethnic and Gender Hierarchies in the Crucible of War. *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(3), 710-722.
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. (2021). The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining. *International Organization*, 75(2),

### **February 24 Order through State Legitimacy**

1. Levi, Margaret, Sacks, Audrey, and Tyler, Tom. 2009. "Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimizing Beliefs." *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(3): 354–75.
2. Schoona, Eric. 2022. "Operationalizing Legitimacy." *American Sociological Review*, 87(3) 478–503.
3. Baldwin, Kate, Kristen Kao and Ellen Lust. 2024. "Is authority fungible? Legitimacy, domain congruence, and the limits of power in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming.
4. Weigel, Jonathan. 2020. "The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(4): 1849-1903.

5. Blair, Robert and Philip Roessler. 2021. "Foreign Aid and State Legitimacy: Evidence on Chinese and US Aid to Africa from Surveys, Survey Experiments, and Behavioral Games." *World Politics*, 73(2): 315-357.

**Working Paper:** Eric Mvukiyeye (2024). "Employment opportunities can enhance social stability in fragile states: Evidence from six large-scale randomized controlled trials in Africa and the Middle East. Working Paper.

OR

Eric Mvukiyeye (2024). The sociopolitical effects of employment programs in fragile states: Evidence from a randomized controlled trial on marginalized youth in Northern Nigeria. Working Paper.

Recommended and further readings:

- Olson, Mancur. 1993. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576.
- Gilley, Bruce. 2006. "The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries." *European Journal of Political Research*, 45: 499-525.
- Gilley, Bruce. 2006. "The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries." *International Political Science Review*, 27(1): 47-71.
- Gates, Scott and Mogens K. Justese. 2020. "Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability: Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Rebel Attack." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64(9): 1693-1723.
- Dickson, Eric, Sanford Gordon<sup>1</sup> and Gregory Huber. 2022. "Identifying legitimacy: Experimental evidence on compliance with authority." *Science Advance*, 8: 7377-
- Imran Arif, Imran and Nabamita Dutta. 2021. "Legitimacy of government and governance." *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 20 (14): 1-23.
- Russell Hardin. 2007. "Compliance, consent, and legitimacy." In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds). 2007. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. London: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007).
- Weatherford, Stephen M. 1992. "Measuring Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review*, 86(1): 149-166.
- Mitchell A. Seligson, "The impact of corruption on regime legitimacy: A comparative study of four Latin American countries." *The Journal of Politics* 64, 2 (2002), pp. 408-433. Also skim through: Niclas Berggren, Christian Bjørnskov and David Lipka. 2015. "Legitimacy and the cost of government." *Public Choice*, 162(¾): 307-328.
- Bates, Robert and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien. 1985. "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government." *Politics & Society*, 14(1): 53-70.
- Migdal, Joel. 2001. *State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 1.]
- Kohli, Atul (2014). "Interpreting India's Democracy: A State- Society Framework." In Kohli, Atul. 2014. (Ed.) *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations*. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Sellers, Jeffrey M. 2010. "State-Society Relations Beyond the Weberian State." In Mark Bevir, Mark (ed.) 2010. *Handbook of Governance*. London: Sage Publications.
- Robbins, Blaine and Edgar Kiser. 2018. "Legitimate authorities and rational taxpayers: An investigation of voluntary compliance and method effects in a survey experiment of income tax evasion." *Rationality and Society* 30(2): 247-301.

- Tyler, Tom R. 2006. "Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation." *Annual Review of Psychology*, 57: 375–400.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. "Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa" *American Political Science Review*, 101(1): 159-172.
- Alexiou, Kostas and Wiggins, Jennifer. 2019. "Measuring individual legitimacy perceptions: Scale development and validation." *Strategic Organization*, 17(4): 470–496.
- Baldwin, Kate; Winters, Matthew S. 2020. "How Do Different Forms of Foreign Aid Affect Government Legitimacy? Evidence from an Informational Experiment in Uganda." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 55(2): 160-183.

### March 3      **Breakdown of order I: State repression and coups**

1. Chenoweth Erica, Perkoski Evan, Kang Sooyeon (2017) State repression and nonviolent resistance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(9): 1950–1969.
2. Christensen, Darin (2018). "The Geography of Repression in Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(7): 1517- 1543.
3. Ritter, E. H., & Conrad, C. (2016). "Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational challenges of explaining strategic repression." *American Political Science Review*, 110(1), 85–99.
4. Young, Lauren (2018). "The Psychology of State Repression: Fear and Dissent Decisions in Zimbabwe." *American Political Science Review*, 113(1): 140- 155.
5. Lachapelle, Jean. 2020. "No Easy Way Out: The Effect of Military Coups on State Repression." *Journal of Politics*, 82(4): 1354-1372.
6. Marinov, Nikolay and Hein Goemans (2013). "Coups and Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 707-716. AND SKIM THROUGH Derpanopoulos, George, Erica Frantz, Barbara Geddes, and Joseph Wright (2016). "Are coups good for democracy?" *Research and Politics*, 1–7.

**Working paper:** Laia Balcells, Laia and Francisco Villamil (2023). "The legacies of authoritarian repression on civil society."

#### Recommended and further readings:

- Hill Daniel, Jones Zachary (2014) An empirical evaluation of explanations for state repression. *American Political Science Review* 108(3): 661–687.
- Hager, Anselm and Krzysztof Krakowski. 2022. "Does State Repression Spark Protests? Evidence from Secret Police Surveillance in Communist Poland." *American Political Science Review* (2022) 116(2): 564–579.
- Paine, Jack (2022). "Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military's Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators." *American Political Science Review*, 116(4): 1425-1442.
- Shadmehr, Medhi and Raphael Boleslavsky (2022). "International Pressure, state repression, and the spread of protest." *Journal of Politics*, 84(1): 148-165.
- Davenport, Christian (2007). "State Repression and Political Order." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10:1-23.
- Davenport Christian (1995) Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3):

- Bell, Curtis and Jun Koga Sudduth. 2017. "The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(7): 1432-1455.
- Ritter, E. H. (2014). "Policy disputes, political survival, and the onset and severity of state repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(1), 143–168.
- Harkness, Kristen (2014). "The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulty of Democratization in Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(4): 587- 616.
- Nordås, R., & Davenport, C. (2013). "Fight the youth: Youth bulges and state repression." *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), 926–940.
- Poe, S. C., & Tate, C. N. (1994). "Repression of human rights to personal integrity in the 1980s: A global analysis." *American Political Science Review*, 88(4), 853–872.
- Koehler, Kevin (2017). "Political militaries in popular uprisings: A comparative perspective on the Arab Spring." *International Political Science Review*, 38(3): 363- 377.
- Roessler, Philip. 2011. "The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa," *World Politics*, 63(2): 300-346.
- Woldense J. 2022. What happens when coups fail? The problem of identifying and weakening the enemy within. *Comp. Political Stud.* In press.
- Powell, Jonathan, Trace Lasley, Rebecca Schiel (2016). "Combating Coups d'états in Africa, 1950-2014." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 51 (4): 482-502.
- De Bruin, Erica (2018). "Preventing Coups d'état: How Counterbalancing Works." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(7): 1433-1458.
- Sudduth, Jun (2017). "Coup risk, coup-proofing and leader survival." *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(1): 3-15.

### March 11 [NO CLASS-SPRING RECESS.]

#### March 17      **Leaders and Autocrats**

1. Debs, A., & Goemans, H. E. (2010). Regime type, the fate of leaders, and war. *American Political Science Review*, 104(03), 430-445. 2.
2. Horowitz, M. C., & Stam, A. C. (2014). How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders. *International Organization*, 68(3), 527-559.
3. Mattes, M., & Weeks, J. L. (2019). Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(1), 53-66.
4. Weeks, J. L. (2012). Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 106(02), 326-347.
5. Michaela Mattes & Mariana Rodriguez. 2014. Autocracies and International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(3): 527-538.

**Working paper:** [None assigned for this week.]

#### Recommended and further readings:

- Michaela Mattes & Mariana Rodriguez. 2014. Autocracies and International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(3): 527-538.

- Krcmaric, D. (2018). Should I Stay or Should I Go? Leaders, Exile, and the Dilemmas of International Justice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(2), 486-498.
- Prorok, A. K. (2016). Leader incentives and civil war outcomes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1), 70-84.
- Rigterink, A. (2021). The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations. *American Political Science Review*, 115(1), 31-50.
- Svolik, M. W. (2012). Contracting on Violence: The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Hollyer, J. R., Rosendorff, B. P., & Vreeland, J. R. (2015). Transparency, protest, and autocratic instability. *American Political Science Review*, 109(04), 764-784.
- Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. (1995). The initiation and termination of enduring rivalries: The impact of political shocks. *American Journal of Political Science*, 30-52.
- Marinov, N. (2005). Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders?. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), 564-576.
- Di Lonardo, L., Sun, J., & Tyson, S. (2020). Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats. *American Political Science Review*, 114(4), 1247-1265.
- Wolford, S. (2007). The turnover trap: New leaders, reputation, and international conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), 772-788.
- Colgan, Jeff D. (2010). "Oil and revolutionary governments: Fuel for international conflict." *International Organization* 64(4): 661-694.

### March 24 The influence of Domestic Audiences on War Choices

1. Gelpi, C., Feaver, P. D., & Reifler, J. (2006). Success matters: Casualty sensitivity and the war in Iraq. *International Security*, 30(3), 7-46. And also read through this critique of the article: Berinsky, A. J. (2007). Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict. *Journal of Politics*, 69(4), 975-997.
2. Croco, S. E. (2011). The decider's dilemma: Leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment. *American Political Science Review*, 105(03), 457-477.
3. Dill, Janina, and Livia I. Schubiger. "Attitudes toward the Use of Force: Instrumental Imperatives, Moral Principles, and International Law." *American Journal of Political Science* 65, no. 3 (2021): 612-633.
4. Brutger, R., & Kertzer, J. (2018). A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs. *International Organization*, 72(3), 693-724.
5. Myrick, R. (2019). Do External Threats Unite or Divide? Security Crises, Rivalries, and Polarization in American Foreign Policy. *International Organization*, 1-38.
6. Tomz, M., Weeks, J. L., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2020). Public opinion and decisions about military force in democracies. *International Organization*, 74(1), 119-143.

**Working paper:** [None assigned for this week.]

### Recommended and further readings:

- Reiter, D., & Stam III, A. C. (1998). Democracy, war initiation, and victory. *American Political Science Review*, 377-389.
- Sambanis, N., Skaperdas, S., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2015). Nation-building through war. *American Political Science Review*, 109(02), 279-296.

- Stein, R. M. (2015). War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 109(03), 556-573.
- Kertzer, J. D., & Brutger, R. (2016). Decomposing audience costs: bringing the audience back into audience cost theory. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1), 234-249.
- Allee, T. L., & Huth, P. K. (2006). Legitimizing dispute settlement: International legal rulings as domestic political cover. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2), 219.
- Tarar, Ahmer, and Bahar Leventoğlu. "Public commitment in crisis bargaining." *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (2009): 817-839.
- Hudson, Valerie M., Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett. "The heart of the matter: The security of women and the security of states." *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2009): 7-45.
- Crisman-Cox, C., & Gibilisco, M. (2018). Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3), 566-580.

### March 31 Breakdown of social order III: Terrorism and the Public

1. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, 31(1): 49-80.
2. Huff, Connor and Joshua Kertzer (2018). "How the Public Defines Terrorism." *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1): 55-71.
3. Mitts. 2019. "From Isolation to Radicalization: Anti-Muslim Hostility and Support for ISIS in the West." *American Political Science Review*, 113(1): 173 – 194.
4. Berman, Eli and David Laitin (2008). "Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model." *Journal of Public Economics*, 92 (10–11): 1942-1967.
5. Godefroidt, Amélie (2023). "How Terrorism Does (and Does Not) Affect Citizens' Political Attitudes: A Meta-Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science*, 67(1): 22–38.
6. Wayne, Carly (2023). "Terrified or Enraged? Emotional Micro-Foundations of Public Responses to Terror." *International Organization*, 77(4): 824-847.

**Working paper:** Fortna, Page (2023). "Is Terrorism Really a Weapon of the Weak? Debunking the Conventional Wisdom." Accessible at: <https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v67y2023i4p642-671.html>

### Recommended and further readings:

- Fortna, Page. 2015. "Do Terrorists Win? The Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes 1989-2009." *International Organization*, (69): 519-556.
- Aksoy, Deniz and David B. Carter. 2014. "Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups." *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(1): 181-204.
- Foster, Margaret J and David A Siegel. 2019. "Pink Slips from the Underground: Changes in Terror Leadership." *International Studies Quarterly* 63(2): 231-243.
- Lake, David. 2003. "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century." *Dialogue IO*, 1(1): 15-28.
- Shapiro, Jacob N., and David A. Siegel. 2012. "Moral hazard, discipline, and the management of terrorist organizations." *World politics*, 64(1): 39-78.

- Kavanagh, Jennifer. 2011. "Selection, Availability, and Opportunity: The Conditional Effect of Poverty of Terrorist Group Participation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (2): 106-132.
- Jelil, Mohamed, Kartika Bhatia, Anne Brockmeyer & Quy-Toan Do and Clement Joubert. 2019. "Unemployment and Violent Extremism: Evidence from Daesh Foreign Recruits." World Bank Working Papers (WPS) #1293.
- McMillan, Cassie. 2020. "Dynamic Patterns of Terrorist Networks: Efficiency and Security in the Evolution of Eleven Islamic Extremist Attack Networks." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 36(1): 559-581.
- Victoroff, Jeff (2005). "The mind of the Terrorist: A review and critiques of psychological approaches." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(1): 3-42.
- Stanton, Jessica. 2013. "Terrorism in the Context of Civil War." *The Journal of Politics*, 75(4): 1009-1022.
- Abdie, Alberto. 2004. "Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism." NBER Working Paper #10859. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10859>.
- Krueger, Alan and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. "Education, poverty, political violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?" NBER Working Paper# 9074. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9074>.

#### April 7 Re(building) order after violence

1. Blair, Robert, Jessica Di Salvatore, Hannah Smith. 2022. "When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 66(3): 664-680.
2. Barnett, Michael and Christopher Zurcher. 2009. "Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood." In *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, edited by Paris, R., Newman, E., 23-52. London, UK: Routledge.
3. Mvukiyeh, Eric and Cyrus Samii. 2017. "Promoting Democracy in Fragile States: Field Experimental Evidence from Liberia," *World Development*, 95: 254-267. Also skim through: Blair, Robert, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Hannah Smidt. 2023. "UN Peacekeeping and Democratization in Conflict-Affected Countries." *American Political Science Review*, 117(4): 1308-1326.
4. Karim, Sabrina. 2020. Relational State Building in Areas of Limited Statehood: Experimental Evidence on the Attitudes of the Police. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2): 536-551.
5. Lyall, Jason, Yang-Yang Zhou, and Kosuke Imai. 2020. "Can Economic Assistance Shape Combatant Support in Wartime? Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review*, 114(1): 126-143.

**Working Paper (option #1):** Brandily-Snyers, Paul, Eric Mvukiyeh, Lodewijk Smets, Peter van der Windt and Marijke Verpoorten (2024). "From Workfare to Economic and Sociopolitical Stability? Evidence from a Randomized Trial in War-Torn Eastern Congo."

**Working Paper (option #2):** Karim, Sabrina et al. (2021.) "International Statebuilding and Civilian Preferences: Evidence from Conjoint Experiments."

Recommended reading on peacekeeping interventions:

- Forna, Page. 2008. "Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War." Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Chapters 1 and 5).
- Gilligan, Michael and Ernest Sergenti. 2008. "Do UN interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve causal inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 89-122.
- Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 779-801.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George Downs. 2006. Intervention and democracy." *International Organization*, 60(3):627-49.
- Nomikos, William G. 2022. "Peacekeeping and the Enforcement of Intergroup Cooperation: Evidence from Mali." *Journal of Politics* 84(1): 194-208.
- Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon. 2013. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4): 875-891.
- Fjelde, Hanne and Hannah Smidt. 2021. "Protecting the Vote? Peacekeeping Presence and the Risk of Electoral Violence." *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-20.
- Howard, L., & Dayal, A. 2018. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping." *International Organization*, 72(1): 71-103.
- Fjelde, Hanne and Hannah Smidt. 2021. "Protecting the Vote? Peacekeeping Presence and the Risk of Electoral Violence." *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-20.
- Howard, L., & Dayal, A. 2018. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping." *International Organization*, 72(1): 71-103.
- Beardsley, Kyle. 2008. Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4): 723-740.
- Isak Svensson. 2009. "Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(3): 446-449.
- Fjelde, H., Hultman, L., & Nilsson, D. (2019). Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians. *International Organization*, 73(1), 103-131.
- Di Salvatore, Jessica. 2019. "Peacekeepers against criminal violence: Unintended effects of peacekeeping operations?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(4): 840-858.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. "The Paradox of "Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation." *American Political Science Review*, 98 (1): 17-33.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 1999. "On the Nature of First Democratic Elections." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(2):245-258.
- Smidt, Hannah. 2020. "Mitigating election violence locally: UN peacekeepers' election-education campaigns in Côte d'Ivoire." *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(1): 199-216.
- Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. "Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-conflict Liberia." *American Economic Review*, 99 (2): 287-91.

Recommended reading on peacebuilding and postwar political processes

- Blair, Robert, Manuel Moscoso, Andrés Vargas, and Michael Weintraub. 2022. "Preventing Rebel Resurgence after Civil War: A Field Experiment in Security and Justice Provision in Rural Colombia." *American Political Science Review*, 116(4): 1258-1277.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2008. "Short- and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations." *The World Bank Economic Review*, 22(1): 9-32.
- Jarstad, Anna and Timothy Sisk. 2008. *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Skim through chapters 1, 2, 6 and 9.]
- Autesserre, Severine. 2017. "International peacebuilding and local success: Assumptions and effectiveness." *International Studies Review*, 19(1): 1-19.
- Samii, Cyrus. 2013. "Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration: Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi." *American Political Science Review* 107(3):558-573.
- Call, Charles and Vanessa Wyeth (eds.). 2008. *Building States to Build Peace*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. (Selected chapters on security sector reforms.)
- Blattman, Christopher, Alexandra Hartman, and Robert Blair. 2014. "How to Promote Order and Property Rights Under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education." *American Political Science Review* 108 (1): 100-
- Alexandra, Hartman, Robert Blair, and Christopher Blattman. 2021. "Engineering Informal Institutions: Long-Run Impacts of Alternative Dispute Resolution on Violence and Property Rights in Liberia" *The Journal of Politics*, 83(1): 381-389.
- Blair, Robert, Sabrina Karim and Ben Morse. 2019. "Establishing the Rule of Law in Weak and War-torn States: Evidence from a Field Experiment with the Liberian National Police." *American Political Science Review*, 113(3): 641-657.
- Chaim, Kaufman (1996). "Possible and impossible solutions to Ethnic and civil wars." *International Security*, 20 (4): 136- 175.

**April 14      A Theory of Contest: A Game Theoretic Approach to Realism in International Relations**

1. Emerson Niou and Guofu. Tan. "External Threat and Collective Action," *Economic Inquiry*, 43(3): 1-12, July 2005.010.
2. Emerson Niou and Sean Zeigler. "External Threat, Internal Rivalry, and Alliance Formation." *Journal of Politics*, 81(2):571-584, April 2019.
3. Emerson Niou and Sean Zeigler. "Entente Versus Alliance: When Should States Be Friends but not Allies?" *Defence and Peace Economics*, May 2023.

**Note from Prof. Niou: "I'd like to encourage our students to delve deeper into these concepts by exploring the references in our papers. This further reading will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the theories and applications in international relations."**

**April 21      The Field of IR and the Crisis of World Politics**

**[READING LIST TBD]**

## Grading Scale

The assignments will be graded on a 16-point scale that is basically a 4-point scale stretched out to 16 points. These grades will not be assigned based on the docking of points, but on the comprehensive assessment of the strength of the material. Grading standards used in the assignment of these values are provided below.

[15-16] -- A (H)  
 [14-15] -- A- (H)  
 [13-14] -- B+ (P)  
 [11-13] -- B (P)  
 [10-11] -- B- (P)  
 [9-10] -- C+ (P)  
 [7-9] -- C (P)  
 [6-7] -- C- (L)  
 [2-6] -- D (L)  
 [0-2] -- F (L)

## Grading Standards

The following standards will be applied to the evaluation of assignments in the class.

A (H) Exceptional Performance.

Consistently outstanding work on all course-related tasks at a level that distinguishes the student from other members of the class. A comprehensive and incisive command of the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. A frequently demonstrated exceptional capacity for original, creative, critical and logical thinking. The ability to master and integrate large amounts of factual material and abstract theories. An outstanding ability to discuss effectively course subject matter using both written and oral communication skills.

A- Excellent Performance.

Consistently strong work on all course-related tasks. A comprehensive command of the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. A clearly demonstrated capacity for original, creative, critical and logical thinking. Understands well and can integrate the relevant factual and theoretical material central to the course. A strong ability to discuss effectively course subject matter using both written and oral communication skills.

B+ (P) Very Good Performance.

Consistently above average work on all course-related tasks. A very good grasp of the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. A generally demonstrated capacity for original, creative, critical, and logical thinking. A very good command of factual and theoretical material, and some capacity to integrate the two. A solid ability to discuss effectively course subject matter using both written and oral communication skills.

B Good Performance.

Good and generally consistent work on all course-related tasks. A general understanding of the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. Modest evidence of the capacity for original, creative, critical and logical thinking. A good understanding of factual and theoretical material, but limited evidence of the capacity to integrate the two. A basic ability to discuss effectively course subject matter using both written and oral communication skills.

**B- Satisfactory Performance**

Satisfactory work on course-related tasks. A reasonable understanding of the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. An infrequently demonstrated capacity for original, creative, critical and logical thinking. Understands at a basic level the facts and theories related to the course, but demonstrates weak integration skills. A limited or inconsistent ability to discuss effectively course subject matter using both written and oral communication skills.

**C+/C/C- (L) Adequate Performance**

Adequate performance on course-related tasks. An understanding of the basic elements of the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. A rarely demonstrated capacity for original, creative, critical and logical thinking. An inability to go beyond a recitation of basic factual material related to the class. Demonstrated weaknesses in the ability to discuss effectively course subject matter using both written and oral communication skills.

**D/D+ Minimal Passing Performance.**

Barely acceptable work on course-related tasks. A generally superficial and often inconsistent familiarity with the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. A failure to demonstrate the capacity for original, creative, critical and logical thinking related to course content. An uneven understanding of basic factual material related to the course; no evidence of fact/theory integration. Demonstrates significant gaps in the ability to discuss effectively course subject matter using both written and oral communication skills.

**F Unacceptable Performance**

Fails to meet minimum course expectations. Unable to understand even the most basic elements of the issues, literature, and substantive information relevant to the course. Demonstrates an inability to engage in coherent written or oral discussion of course material. Does not satisfy specific course expectations with respect to attendance, deadlines, participation, etc.

**Expectations (adapted from Prof. Beardsley's Syllabus for 659).**

*Late work*

Requests for deadline extensions should be made at least 72 hours in advance of a due date. All work will receive a two-point (out of 16) deduction for each day late. Work that is turned in on the same day as a due date but after the required time is considered one day late.

*Use of AI/LLMs*

Copying verbatim any text generated via artificial intelligence (e.g., Large Language Models) is prohibited for all assignments in this course unless discussed first with the instructor. Since the assignments for this course are useful for practice in academic writing, the prohibition includes uses of AI/LLM assistance in cleaning up grammar and clarity of writing. You may use AI/LLMs as part of your background research in understanding the state of the literature or to become familiar with a concept that is new to you, but you should do so with caution: LLMs tend to do poorly in summarizing work that is gated behind publisher pay walls, they tend to miss contributions to the literature that are either very recent or very old, and they tend to invent (hallucinate) scholarship that does not exist. It is strongly advised that you verify the content of any work suggested to you via AI/LLM assistance before referencing it and that you use additional means of surveying the literature.

### *Duke Community Standard*

All students must adhere to the [Duke Community Standard](#) (DCS): Duke University has high expectations for students' scholarship and conduct. In accepting admission, students indicate their willingness to subscribe to and be governed by the rules and regulations of the university, which flow from the Duke Community Standard.

Regardless of course delivery format, it is the responsibility of all students to understand and follow all Duke policies, including academic integrity (e.g., completing one's own work, following proper citation of sources, adhering to guidance around group work projects, and more). Ignoring these requirements is a violation of the Duke Community Standard. Any questions and/or concerns regarding academic integrity can be directed to the [Office of Student Conduct and Community Standards](#) at [conduct@duke.edu](mailto:conduct@duke.edu).

## **Resources**

### *Wellness*

Student mental health and wellness are of primary importance at Duke, and the university offers resources to support students in managing daily stress and self-care. Duke offers several resources for students to seek assistance on coursework and to nurture daily habits that support overall well-being, some of which are listed below:

- **The Academic Resource Center:** (919) 684-5917, [theARC@duke.edu](mailto:theARC@duke.edu), or [arc.duke.edu](http://arc.duke.edu).
- **DuWell:** (919) 681-8421, provides Moments of Mindfulness (stress management and resilience building) and meditation programming (Koru workshop) to assist students in developing a daily emotional well-being practice. To see schedules for programs please see <https://studentaffairs.duke.edu/duwell>. All are welcome and no experience necessary.

If your mental health concerns and/or stressful events negatively affect your daily emotional state, academic performance, or ability to participate in your daily activities, many resources are available to help you through difficult times. Duke encourages all students to access these resources.

- **DukeReach.** Provides comprehensive outreach services to identify and support students in managing all aspects of well-being. If you have concerns about a student, visit the website for resources and assistance: <https://students.duke.edu/wellness/dukereach/>
- **Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS).** CAPS services include individual and group counseling services, psychiatric services, and workshops. CAPS also provides referral to off-campus resources for specialized care. (919) 660-1000 or <https://students.duke.edu/wellness/caps/>
- **TimelyCare (formerly known as Blue Devils Care).** An online platform that is a convenient, confidential, and free way for Duke students to receive 24/7 mental health support through TalkNow and scheduled counseling. [bluedevilscares.duke.edu](https://bluedevilscares.duke.edu)
  - **Other Resources**

If you are a student with a disability and need accommodations for this class, it is your responsibility to register with the [Student Disability Access Office \(SDAO\)](#) and provide them with documentation of your disability. SDAO will work with you to determine what accommodations are appropriate for your situation. Please note that accommodations are not retroactive and disability accommodations cannot be provided until a Faculty Accommodation Letter has been given to me. Please contact SDAO for more information: [sdao@duke.edu](mailto:sdao@duke.edu) or [access.duke.edu](https://access.duke.edu).

Students might also find the resources at the **Thompson Writing Program** helpful. Students can schedule an appointment to discuss ways to improve as a writer at <https://twp.duke.edu/>.